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R ecently; while standing at the library check-out counter, a student noticed the journal in my hand. He pondered for a moment, then offered this reflection: "Hmmm-the 
South African Law Journal; isn't that an oxymoron?" 
I am not sure he quite appreciated how complex his 
rhetorical question really was. 
South African lawyers have always been proud of 
the rich blend of Roman-Dutch and Anglo-American 
common law that constitutes their legal system. We 
like to believe our judges have taken the best from each 
to build a body of contractual, delict (tort), property; 
criminal and commercial law doctrine that is sophis-
ticated, rich and flexible. 
* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. A 
native of South Africa, Professor Baxter came to Duke 
in 1985 from the University of Natal. This article is 
an updated version of a talk given at Duke Law Alumni 
Weekend on September 27, 1986. 
We also like to recall those grand moments in 
which judges upheld the prinCiples of liberty and 
democracy in the face of authoritarian government. 
In 1879, when a part of the Cape Colony was in a 
state of rebellion, a Griqua chief and his son, suspected 
by the government of instigating rebellion, had been 
unlawfully detained. The chief justice, Sir John Henry 
de Villiers, granted their petition for habeas corpus. 
He strongly rejected the government's contention 
that this action would foment further disturbances: 
It is said the country is in such an unsettled state, and 
the applicants are reputed to be of such a dangerous 
character, that the Court oUght not to exercise a power 
which under ordinary circumstances might be usefully 
and properly exercised. The disturbed state of the country 
oUght not in my opinion to influence the Court, for its 
first and most sacred duty is to administer justice to 
those who seek it, and not to preserve the peace of 
the country. If a different argument were to prevail, it 
might so happen that injustice towards individual 
natives has disturbed and unsettled a whole tribe, and 
the Court would be prevented from removing the very 
cause which produced the disturbance. 1 
Soon afterwards the chief justice issued another 
writ of habeas corpus, and he was then able to observe 
with satisfaction that "none of the disastrous conse-
quences which were confidently predicted [by the 
Crown in the earlier case] ever ensued."2 
Nearly two decades later the judiciary in the old 
South African Republic, now the Transvaal, clashed 
head-on with both President Kruger and the Trekker 
Parliament. The Court, quoting (in Dutch translation!) 
from Alexander Hamilton's Federalist No. 78 and from 
John Marshall's opinion in Marbury v: Madison,J 
declared a resolution unconstitutional,4 thereby pre-
cipitating a constitutional crisis which was resolved 
only by the eventual departure of the Chief Justice 
for another South African bench. 
Much later, South Africa's highest court, the Appellate 
Division, took a heroic stand against parliament and 
the executive when the new Nationalist government 
attempted-successfully in the end-to disenfranchise 
non-white voters in the 1950's.5 In the process the 
court attracted international admiration. 
But the South African courts have more recently 
acquired a different reputation. To some South Africans 
and many foreign observers, the legal system now seems 
a grotesque parody of everything Western lawyers v:alue. 
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South African lawyers have always been 
proud of the rich blend of Roman-
Dutch and Anglo-American common 
law that constitutes their legal system. 
we like to believe our judges have 
taken the best from each to build a 
body of contractual, delict (tort), 
property, criminal and commercial 
law doctrine that is sophisticated, 
rich and flexible. 
Critics have used various epithets: "quintessentially 
unjust," "wicked," "repressive."6 Inn Fuller once used 
South African legislation to illustrate his thesis that 
legislation lacking certain moral characteristics could 
not be described as "law" at all.7 A fact-fmding team 
of the International Commission of Jurists recently 
announced that "the 'judges' presence on the bench 
lent 'undeserved credibility' to a legal system in which 
personal and political freedom was left unprotected;"8 
and some jurists have called upon the judges to 
resign from the bench. 
There are a number of reasons. First, the South 
African government has used sweeping, often draconian, 
legislation as the primary means of articulating and 
implementing the policy of apartheid. The constitu-
tional model that was adopted in South Africa is that 
of parliamentary government. The executive is theoreti-
cally accountable to parliament; in practice, however, 
it has been able, through the party system and a 
permanent parliamentary majority, to gain full control 
over the legislature. With one trivial exception (relat-
ing to the official languages), the Republic constitu-
tion contains no protection of human rights; these 
can be infringed by ordinary act of parliament. It 
therefore fails to operate as a significant restraint. Unlike 
their American counterparts, judges cannot strike 
down acts of the "sovereign" parliament. They are 
confmed to interpreting and applying this legislation. 
Second, the government has attempted to foreclose 
the remaining avenues of review insofar as administra-
tive rules, orders, and actions are concerned. Although 
theoretically subject to judicial review (for want of 
compliance with the relevant act of parliament), the 
governing statutes have themselves frequently con-
tained provisions purporting, in the clearest possible 
terms, to preclude any judicial review whatsoever. 
One of the most explicit examples is section 29 of 
the Internal Security Act,9 which reads: "No court of 
law shall have jurisdiction to pronounce upon the 
Validity of any action taken in terms of this section, 
or to order the release of any person detained in 
terms of the provisions of this section." Provisions 
such as these led one jurist to liken the role of the 
South African judiciary to that of an umpire who has 
been stripped of the power to rule on all the essential 
aspects of the ball game. 10 
The executive also controls the appointment of 
judges, all of whom, with one recent exception,11 are 
white. Unlike the lower magistracy, which is staffed 
entirely by employees of the Department of Justice, 
the judges of the Supreme Court do enjoy security of 
tenure until the mandatory retirement age of 70, but 
it is inevitable that the appointment power should 
influence the character of the judiciary to some 
degree. In 1955, after the government had suffered a 
series of adverse decisions in the Appellate Division, 
the size of the court was increased to enable the 
government to add six judges to the five then Sitting. 
These factors, coupled with the fact that the govern-
ment has remained in power for nearly forty years, 
led to the creation of a judiciary that displayed meek 
acquiescence in the face of an increasingly draconian 
body of apartheid and security legislation. 
During the 1960's and 1970's the role of the courts 
as protectors of liberty and equality reached its nadir. 
In a manner reminiscent of some judges during the 
slavery era in the United States,12 the South African 
judiciary protested their inability to ameliorate the 
harshness of the legislation they were called on to 
apply. The most notorious example was Minister of 
the Interior v. Lockhat, 13 where the court had been 
asked to rule that group areas legislation (which requires 
that land be demarcated for exclusive use by members 
of one race group) should be applied in a manner 
that did not have disparate impact as between races. 
Notwithstanding the existence of an important 
precedent to this effect,14 Holmes JA, speaking for 
the unanimous court, concluded that 
[t]he Group Areas Act represents a colossal social experi-
ment and a long term policy. It necessarily involves the 
movement out of Group Areas of numbers of people 
throughout the country. Parliament must have envis-
aged that compulsory population shifts of persons 
occupying certain areas would inevitably cause disrup-
tion and, within the foreseeable future, substantial 
inequalities. Whether all this will ultimately prove to be 
for the common weal of all the inhabitants is not for 
the Court to decide. 15 
Even where statutes were vague, judges seemed to 
have little difficulty filling in the details, thereby 
intensifying the harshness of their application. An 
illustration is Rossouw v. Sachs, 16 where the Appellate 
Division ruled that a detainee was entitled to no 
more daily exercise or reading material than that 
officially permitted, even though the relevant act of 
parliament was silent on this point and despite the 
existence of precedent to the effect that a prisoner 
awaiting trial retains whatever rights the empowering 
legislation does not expressly take away.17 By a spec-
tacular piece of anti-libertarian reasoning, Ogilvie 
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Thompson JA took the view that since the statute 
already constituted a drastic inroad into traditional 
principles of South African criminal procedure, one 
had to assume that it also intended to eliminate all 
residual rights of detainees other than the right to 
basic "necessities"!18 
A leading South African jurist has concluded that 
"the Supreme Court, since 1950 when the total on-
slaught on freedom and legality began, has failed 
(with some exceptions) to protect individual liberty, 
to understand and apply the requirements of due 
process, to check or restrain arbitrary action and to 
speak resolutely against uncivilized and sometimes 
barbarous official behavior."19 
Casual observers might be tempted to conclude 
that the South African legal system not only fails to 
protect the vast majority of South Africans but actively 
facilitates the imposition and maintenance of apartheid. 
Like the legal systems of Nazi Germany and various 
other totalitarian regimes of recent history, it must be 
a gigantic and tragic farce. 20 But such a conClusion 
would be too facile. Not only does it depend upon 
simplistic analogies and a narrowly segmented view of 
the legal system which overlooks large areas of the law 
that are almost untainted by apartheid legislation, but 
it also fails to take into account the fact that thousands 
of black South Africans, including most of those who 
are politically sophisticated and of radical persuasion, 
regularly resort to the courts in an attempt to challenge 
various facets of apartheid. It overlooks the fact that 
many (black and White) South African lawyers, possessing 
impeccable democratic and human rights credentials, 
regard the legal system as providing at least a partial 
protection against the onslaught of apartheid. 
Most important of all, such a conclusion does not 
square with the dramatic judicial about-turn that has 
occurred during the past five years. This truly remark-
able development merits some description since it 
has been little noticed or understood in the United 
States.21 How, I am often asked, can judges do much 
in a system that has the features I have briefly described? 
Faced by a sovereign, executive-controlled parlia-
ment, no bill of rights, powers delegated to officials 
and the police in far-reaching terms and protected 
by a web of unreviewability clauses, what could the 
judges really do to protect individual rights and polit-
ical expreSSion, even if they wanted to? The answer 
is, quite a lot. But it requires a major shift in judicial 
attitude-a shift in which Duke Law School can claim 
a small part! 
As the pro-apartheid attitude of the Appellate 
Division became clear during the 1960's, a few South 
African jurists began to level criticism at the judges 
for their failure to apply presumptions of interpreta-
tion that were more favorable to individuals than to 
the government. Among the most prominent of the 
critics was John Dugard, a former visiting professor 
at Duke Law School and presently professor of law at 
During the 1960's and 1970's the role 
of the courts as protectors of liberty 
and equality reached its nadir. In a 
manner reminiscent of some judges 
during the slavery era in the United 
States, the South African judiciary 
protested their inability to ameliorate 
the harshness of the legislation they 
were called on to apply. 
the University of the Witwatersrand and Director of 
its Center for Applied Legal Studies. During visits to 
the United States he had been impressed by the 
success of the civil rights movement in the courts. 
Of course, the United States Constitution was central 
to the movement's strategy, and South Africa lacks a 
counterpart. But Dugard was also influenced by the 
views of the American legal realists, from whom he 
learned that judges enjoy a much greater range of 
choice in the characterization of evidence and the 
construction of statutes than they are often prepared 
to admit. He began to advocate the persistent resort 
to the courts in South Africa as a means of resisting 
government action. In 1974, while visiting at Duke, 
he wrote the bulk of his most important work, 
Human Rights and the South African Legal Order;22 a 
comprehensive study and critique of the role of the 
South African judiciary in the maintenance of human 
rights in South Africa. 
Criticisms such as those leveled by Dugard and 
others at first enraged the judges. They were met with 
stern reproach from the ChiefJustice.23 One outspoken 
critic, the late Barend van Niekerk, was actually twice 
prosecuted for contempt of court.24 But some judges 
gradually began to respond. Towards the end of the 
1970's, and especially since about 1983, a few started 
handing down decisions in the field of race and security 
legislation that were surprisingly adverse to the govern-
ment. A Natal judge, setting aside an influx control 
order that had been issued against an African who 
had been deemed "idle and undesirable," severely 
criticized the legislation concerned in terms that attracted 
considerable local publicity 25 A judge in the Transkei 
granted habeas corpus to a detainee who had been held 
under broadly-couched security legislation. Echoing 
Sir Henry de Villiers, he declared that "the criteria 
[for] ascertaining the intention of a statute do not 
differ according to the relative tranquility or disrup-
tion of a community, but remain the same."26 
This trickle of judicial resistance has since become 
a flow that even the two states of emergency, accom-
panied by regulations that are breathtaking in their 
sweep, have failed to stem. At all levels and in most 
provincial jurisdictions of the Supreme Court, judges 
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have declared executive action under widely-framed 
statutes governing forced removals,27 pass law viola-
tions28 and influx controF9 to be illegal. In 1982 they 
effectively paralyzed the South African government's 
attempt to denationalize almost a million blacks by 
transferring their residential areas to an independent 
country, Swaziland.30 An order of the State President 
requiring removal of a black tribe from its ancestral 
home against its will was declared unlawful, notwith-
standing the fact that in 1975 the South African Parliament 
had attempted by resolution to validate his action in 
advance.31 The administration of influx control was 
severely hampered by a series of decisions that imposed 
liberal constructions upon the narrow statutory rights 
of residence enjoyed by Africans living in urban areas;32 
these decisions have affected the lives of thousands, 
This trickle of judicial resistance has 
since become a flow that even the two 
states of emergenc.M accompanied by 
by regulations that are breathtaking in 
their sweep) have failed to stem. 
and potentially hundreds of thousands, of African 
urban dwellers, and the government was eventually 
compelled to repeal the governing legislation.33 A 
series of decisions of the Transvaal Provincial Division 
has also effectively brought to a halt prosecutions of 
blacks living in white areas in violation of group 
areas legislation.34 
Most striking of all has been the judicial response 
in litigation involving the actions of the police and 
security forces, under both the permanent security 
legisiation3S and the states of emergency36 Even in 
strong democracies, such as Britain and the United 
States, the courts have a predictable tendency to defer 
to the executive at times of national crisis.37 Nor should 
we assume that this occurs only at a time of war/8 
the contrary is amply illustrated by recent cases in 
both Britain39 and the United States.40 
Yet it is in the area of state security that the activism 
of the South African courts has been greatest. In Natal, 
the Eastern Cape, the Transvaal and Namibia, in the 
Appellate Division and in other provincial jurisdictions, 
judges have rendered ineffective the most broadly 
phrased unreviewability clauses in the South African 
statute book. Though expressly forbidden to review 
the lawfulness of police action in detaining individuals 
or to grant writs of habeas corpus and related remedies, 
they have done so repeatedly and have ordered the 
release of numerous detainees. 41 The courts have 
literally interpreted the preclusionary clauses, including 
the one quoted in this article, out of existence.42 
Employing expansive canons of construction and 
drawing on common law presumptions of statutory 
interpretation, the courts have rejected as inadequate 
the provision by the government of sham or "skeleton" 
reasons for detentions (in other words, mere regurgita-
tions of the empowering statutory clauses), 43 and in 
some cases have imposed fair hearing requirements 
even where the legislation seemed not to contemplate 
that these should be observed.44 They have ordered 
prison officials to allow detainees access to legal advisers 
in the face of regulations to the contrary.4S 
Using the technique of strict construction, judges 
in Natal and the Transvaal have rejected certificates 
presented by the Attorney-General purporting to pro-
hibit the granting of bail to persons charged with 
security offenses.46 In a particularly outrageous instance 
of police intimidation, the traditional protection of 
attorney-client privilege was reinforced when a court 
ruled illegal the police's seizure on warrant of a written 
statement taken from a witness by a firm of attorneys 
acting for the wife of a detainee who had died while 
under arrest. The court very strictly construed the 
ostensibly-broad wording of the warrant.47 
Some judges have begun to subject official action 
to vigorous, "hard look" review. In Natal, the Western 
and Eastern Cape and the Transvaal they have set aside 
banning orders placed upon individuals,48 meetings49 
and funeralsso by officials acting under broadly-phrased 
security legislation. In Natal, especially, they have amel-
iorated the draconian scope of the statutory offenses 
against the state, which have been used to harass oppo-
nents of the government, by imposing tough procedural 
and evidential requirements,Sl by restricting the scope 
of the offensess2 and by inserting a requirement of 
subjective, specific mens rea where the wording of 
the provisions has remotely permitted. S3 
They have also become more receptive to allega-
tions of maltreatment. Courts around the country have 
upheld claims of torture by ex-detaineess4 and have 
issued interdictsSS to the extent that the government 
has been driven, in many cases, to release detaineess6 
and settle damages claims out of court for fear of per-
mitting yet further adverse precedents to be created.s7 
Some judges have adapted a remedy, derived from 
English commercial law, which authorizes the pre-
emptive search, without notice, of a police station or 
prison for the purpose of obtaining evidence relating 
to allegations of torture or maltreatment. 58 
The government seems to have assumed that by 
imposing a state of emergency and suspending the opera-
tion of the meager safeguards of Parliamentary legisla-
Even in strong democracies) such as 
Britain and the United States) the 
courts have a predictable tendency to 
defer to the executive at times of 
national crisis. 
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tion it would avoid embarrassment and obstruction 
in the courts. After all, a state of emergency, like martial 
law, is usually thought to suspend, in practice if not 
in theory, the jurisdiction of the courts. But here too 
judicial protection has not been entirely eliminated. 
Various courts have ruled sections of the emergency 
proclamations affecting detainees, 59 the press,60 freedom 
of expression,61 and public gatherings62 invalid. Under 
the second state of emergency (imposed in June of 
1986) there had already been 218 court applications 
against the validity of the declared state of emergency 
itself, or actions taken under it, by late September of 
1986!63 
These decisions have forced the government to 
amend and tighten the wording of the emergency proc-
and associated regulations under the glare of 
mternational publicity and without ever being sure that 
it has plugged all the gaps. And now, having created 
an unwieldy tricameral parliamentary system in which 
South Africans of Indian descent and of mixed race 
have a limited role, the government can no longer rely 
on the speedy assistance of a compliant "sovereign" 
legislature to validate its illegalities; instead it has been 
forced, after fIrst having to wait until Parliament actu-
ally is in session, frustratedly to coax unwilling legis-
lators, many of whom have resorted to dilatory tactics 
to stall legislative amendments.64 
The full implications of the cases described here 
as well as their overall impact, require much fuller exanti-
nation and should not be exaggerated. There have also 
been a signifIcant number of decisions in favor of the 
government, and judicial activism is probably still con-
fmed to a minority of judges. There are still a number 
of judges who appear to be adopting the views and 
attitudes of their counterparts of the 1960's and 1970's; 
some have meted out savage sentences to youthful 
protesters; the notorious Delmas treason trial proceeds 
in the Transvaal. 
Even so, the mere existence of contrary decisions, 
let alone their actual number, is remarkable. This raises 
a wide range of questions concerning the constitutional-
ist and interpretive theories that might explain these 
decisions. It reminds us of the obvious but frequently 
forgotten that judges, having once acquired tenure, 
often surpnse those who appointed them. More impor-
tantly, it demonstrates the complexity of the lengthy 
debate among liberal South African legal scholars over 
the appropriate role of judges in an unjust society and 
whether they should resign. The legal system and the 
judiciary cannot simply be dismissed as a reflection 
of the apartheid state, nor can the decisions surveyed 
here be fairly described as "occasional judicial expostu-
lations in the name of justice" or "faint voices in the 
ild "65 T b w erness. l.A1.ge num ers of real people are enjoying 
the benefIts of these "expostulations." 
The impact of "liberal" decision-making in South 
Africa may still be dwarfed by the larger political events. 
It is unrealistic to assume that the judiciary can be an 
important agent for the abolition of apartheid itself. 
The government seems to have assumed 
that by imposing a state of emergency 
and suspending the operation of the 
meager safeguards of Parliamentary 
legislation it would avoid embarrass-
ment and obstruction in the courts. 
After all} a state of like 
martial law, is usually thought to 
suspend} in practice if not in theory, 
the jurisdiction of the courts. 
The most the judges can do is serve to reduce the oppres-
sion, help to protect the agents of political change, 
and display the virtue of an independent judiciary to 
South Africa's future rulers. Perhaps in the end, through 
a combination of increasingly vicious reactions on 
the part of the government, exhaustion on the part 
of some judges and recalcitrance on the part of others, 
every ember of judicial protection will be snuffed 
out. 
Nevertheless, we should not underestimate the signifi-
cance of judicial resistance. The judiciary enjoys immense 
prestige and credibility in the eyes of most whites, and 
the business community could not function without 
it. To this extent, therefore, it is a branch of government 
that is very diffIcult to subordinate, which, through its 
very actions and criticism, can help further to erode 
the monolithic power base upon which the govern-
ment presently relies. Parliament could theoretically 
abolish the courts altogether, or render judges remov-
able at the whim of the executive. Or the government 
could just ignore their decisions. 66 But until this has 
happened, what the South African judges have been 
doing to resist apartheid, what they can and should 
be doing, and whether they should collectively resign 
are issues that demand much more complex analysis 
than has hitherto been accorded them in the United 
States. 
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